Quantum Risk Preferences in a Laboratory Experiment by Todorova, Lora R.
WORKING PAPER SERIES
Quantum Risk Preferences in a Laboratory Experiment
Lora R. Todorova
Working Paper No. 25/2012
 Impressum (§ 5 TMG)  
Herausgeber:  
Otto-von-Guericke-Universität Magdeburg  
Fakultät für Wirtschaftswissenschaft  
D?? Dekan  
 
Verantwortlich für diese Ausgabe:  
Otto-von-Guericke-Universität Magdeburg 
Fakultät für Wirtschaftswissenschaft 
Postfach 4120  
39016 Magdeburg  
Germany  
http://www.?ww.???????/femm
Bezug über den Herausgeber 
ISSN 1615-4274 
Lora R. Todorova
1 
Quantum Risk Preferences in a Laboratory 
Experiment 
 
Lora R. Todorova
1
 
1 Otto-von-Guericke University Magdeburg, Faculty of Economics and Management, Empirical 
Economics Research, P. O. Box 4120, D-39106 Magdeburg, Germany. E-mail: 
lora.todorova@ovgu.de. 
 
 
This paper presents a quantum model of risk preferences that seeks to provide an 
explanation of the experimental results reported in Berninghaus, Todorova & 
Vogt (2012). The finding that subjects choose the risk-dominant strategy in a 
2 2 coordination game, on the average, more often, when they have previously 
completed a risk questionnaire, is not anticipated by the standard economic 
theory. The model presented in this paper demonstrates that the coordination 
game and the risk questionnaire can be analyzed as two decisions situations that 
do not commute and predicts that the order in which decisions are made will 
influence behavioral choices. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Expected utility theory (von Neumann & Morgenstern 1947) is the standard 
economic model of decision making under risk. It is based on a set of assumptions 
that specify how a rational decision maker will choose between risky alternatives. 
Empirical evidence suggests, however, that decision making is more complex than 
what is assumed by the rational choice framework, as people are found to act 
differently in repeated decision situations involving equivalent choice problems 
(e.g., Camerer 1989; Starmer & Sugden 1989; Hey & Orme 1994). Changes in risk 
preferences are found to be induced by non-normative factors, such as framing 
(Tversky 1969), compatibility effects (Lichtenstein & Slovic 1971), elicitation 
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procedures (Hershey & Schoemaker 1985; Bostic et al. 1990), and game relativity 
(Vlaev & Chater 2006). 
 The mathematical formalism of quantum mechanics has already been applied to 
extend the analysis of the classical economic theory on the equilibrium selection 
problem in games (Meyer 1999, Eisert; Wilkens & Lewenstein 1999). Meyer (1999) 
proves that if players in zero-sum games, and more precisely in the matching 
pennies game, are allowed to use quantum strategies, then they can always earn 
payoff at least as good as the one obtainable by application of standard strategies 
(pure or mixed). Wilkens & Lewenstein (1999) study nonzero-sum games, and in 
particular the prisoner’s dilemma. They show that the dilemma can be avoided if 
both players use quantum strategies. Khrennikov (2008) offers a quantum-like 
representation of the well-known from cognitive psychology Shafir–Tversky 
statistical effect (Shafir & Tversky 1992). Another application of the mathematical 
formalism of quantum mechanics in social sciences is discussed in Lambert-
Mogiliansky, Zamir & Zwirn (2009). The basic idea behind the quantum approach 
of Lambert-Mogiliansky, Zamir & Zwirn (2009) is that there exists an intrinsic 
indeterminacy of the type of an individual. It is suggested that when asked to make a 
decision choice, people actualize one of the many coexisting types. 
 Inspired by the advancement in the literature to extend the analysis of equilibrium 
selection in economic games with insights from quantum mechanics, I, in this paper, 
apply a model of quantum preferences to the results of a laboratory experiment on 
strategy selection in a 2 2 coordination game (Berninghaus, Todorova & Vogt 
2012 [from now on BTV]). The aim of this study is to demonstrate that by extending 
players’ risk preferences to the quantum domain, the perplexing in the light of the 
standard economic theory experimental results in BTV, receive a plausible 
explanation. 
 BTV present results from an experiment designed to study the effect produced on 
strategy choices when a subject reports risk preferences on a risk questionnaire 
before engaging in a 2 2 coordination game. BTV’s main finding is that the act of 
stating one’s own risk preferences significantly alters strategic behavior in the 
coordination game. In particular, subjects tend to choose the risk-dominant strategy 
more often when they have previously stated their attitudes to risk. This finding is 
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not anticipated by the internal consistency of preferences assumption of expected 
utility theory, stating that in theoretically equivalent situations people will always 
make the same behavioral choices. The model of uncertain preferences presented in 
this paper offers an explanation to the experimental results of BTV. 
 The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the 
2 2 coordination game used in BTV. Section 3 summarizes the experimental design 
and results of BTV. Section 4 introduces the basic mathematical tools of quantum 
mechanics. The model of uncertain preferences is developed in Section 4. Section 5 
concludes. 
 
 
2. The Game 
  
Coordination games are non-cooperative, common interest games with multiple, 
usually Pareto-ranked, Nash equilibria. In a 2 2 coordination game, the two players 
have to simultaneously choose either Strategy A or Strategy B. Subjects’ payoffs are 
determined by the combination of their strategies—see Figure 1. The game depicted 
in Figure 1 has two Pareto-ranked pure strategies Nash equilibria ([A, A] and [B, B]) 
and one equilibrium in mixed strategies. In this game, (A, A) is the Pareto-dominant 
equilibrium and (B, B) is the risk-dominant equilibrium (Harsanyi & Selten 1988). 
 
ssssjfjfj
125, 0
200, 200
150, 150
0, 125
A
B
A
B
Column Player
R
o
w
 P
la
y
e
r
 
FIGURE 1. —The baseline game 
 
 In coordination games, achievement of mutual gains is possible only if agents 
make mutually consistent decisions. The failure to coordinate on a certain action 
results in disequilibrium and inferior payoffs. Despite the strong incentives to make 
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coordinated decisions, however, strategy selection in coordination games is not a 
trivial problem because the structure of the game provides no universal device to 
coordinate actions on any of the multiple equilibria. The difficulty in determining 
what, if any, equilibrium point will be expected in the game shown in Figure 1, 
arises from the fact that although the equilibrium point (A, A) is associated with a 
higher payoff for both players, playing Strategy A is risky. In contrast, playing 
Strategy B results in a payoff, that albeit lower than the one attainable in the 
equilibrium point (A, A), is only marginally affected by the other players’ actions.   
 
 
3. The Experiment 
 
BTV present a laboratory experiment with a two-conditions between-subjects design 
that studies strategy choices in a 2 2  one-shot coordination game and examine how 
these depend on the act of completing a risk questionnaire. In one condition 
(Condition G), subjects were asked to select a strategy in the 2 2 coordination 
game presented in Figure 1. In another condition (Condition Q_G), subjects were 
instructed to first fill out a questionnaire about their own risk preferences and then to 
play the 2 2 coordination game presents in Figure 1. The summary data of the 
distributions of choices in the coordination game from conditions G and Q_C are 
given in Table 1. 
 
TABLE 1: Distribution of strategy choices in the coordination game 
          Condition G    Condition Q_G 
Number of participants    56       54 
Strategy A chosen       37 (66%)    27 (50%) 
Strategy B chosen        19 (34%)    27 (50%) 
 
 The questionnaire consisted of three questions. In Question 1, subjects were 
asked whether they liked taking risks; In Question 2, whether they always tried to 
avoid risks. Admissible answers were “Agree,” “Disagree”, and “Neither agree nor 
disagree.” In the third question, subjects were asked to determine their risk 
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preference with greater precision by positioning it on a scale of 0 (most risk loving) 
to 100 (most risk averse). 
 Table 2 shows that 34 percent of the subjects chose Strategy B when they played 
the coordination game right away. When the subjects were asked to first complete 
the risk questionnaire and then to play the coordination game, 50 percent of all 
players selected Strategy B. The null hypothesis of equal proportions is rejected at 
the five percent level of significance (Z-test, z-statistics: 1.7083; p-value: 0.04379). 
 Within a best-response correspondence framework, this result can be explained 
by a shift in either beliefs or risk preferences. With the help of two additional 
conditions, in which players’ first order beliefs were elicited (Murphy & Winkler 
1970), BTV show that the act of completing the questionnaire exerts no influence on 
subjects’ beliefs. This result implies that subjects should have become, on the 
average, more risk-averse after they completed the risk questionnaire. 
 BTV’s experimental results contradict the internal consistency of preferences 
assumption of expected utility theory. Also, the conclusion that subjects become, on 
the average, more risk-averse after completing the questionnaire cannot be justified 
by any arguments in a world with deterministic preferences. A model of uncertain 
preferences, based on the model of Lambert-Mogiliansky, Zamir & Zwirn (2009), 
which provides an explanation of the BTV’s experimental results, is presented 
below. 
 
 
4. Mathematical Tools of Quantum Mechanics 
 
Quantum mechanics provides a mathematical and conceptual framework for the 
development of the laws governing a physical system. The simplest quantum 
mechanical system is the quibit, which is a vector in the two-dimensional complex 
vector state space. The vectors 0
 
and 1  form an orthonormal basis in the relevant 
Hilbert space. The state of a quibit is described by the linear combination of the 
vectors belonging to its basis: 
(1) 1 20 1 .     
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 The numbers 
1
and 
2
are complex numbers and are often referred to as 
amplitudes. The state of a quibit is not observable. A measurement of the quibit will 
result in either 0 or 1 with probabilities 
2
1
and 
2
2
, respectively. Since the 
probability must sum up to 1, it follows that
2 2
1 2 1   . This is often referred to 
as the normalization condition that should always be fulfilled for a legitimate 
quantum state. The amplitudes 
1
and 
2
 could be determined only if infinitely 
many identically prepared quibits are measured. Another interesting property of a 
quibit is that its post-measurement state is different from its pre-measurement state. 
That is, if a quibit is initially in the state   and the result of a measurement is 0, 
its state after the measurement collapses to 0 . Analogously, if a measurement 
yields 1, the post-measurement state of the quibit is 1 . 
 It is useful to think of a measurement as a linear operator applied to the relevant 
vector space. In the matrix representation, a linear operator is nothing more than a 
matrix. When a physical system is measured, the result of the measurement is a 
value equal to one of the eigenvalues of the operator used.  An important for the 
subsequent analysis question is whether two operators A and B commute. Two 
operators are said to commute if AB BA .  If A and B are Hermitian operators (A is 
a Hermitian operator if its adjoint is A) then they can be simultaneously 
diagonalized. That is, we can write i
i
A a i i

and i
i
B b i i

, where i is 
some common orthonormal set of eigenvectors for A and B, and ia and ib are the 
eigenvalues corresponding to these eigenvectors. It will be shown later that the 
property of whether two operators commute has direct implications for the way in 
which the state of the system is expressed 
 
 
5. The Model 
 
The evidence that beliefs do not change after completing the risk questionnaire 
indicates that it is sufficient to model only risk preferences as possessing quantum 
7 
properties. The following analogy, adopted from Lambert-Mogiliansky, Zamir & 
Zwirn (2009), is used to link quantum mechanics to uncertain preferences: any 
decision situation is modeled as an operator, and the behavior observed in the 
decision situation is viewed as an eigenvalue of the operator. Prior to the decision 
situation, every player is in a state that is a linear combination of the eigenvectors 
corresponding to the eigenvalues of the relevant operators. This implies that, in 
contrast to standard economic theory, stating that the type of a player is 
deterministic, in the quantum mechanical framework, there is inherent 
indeterminacy of preferences. 
 In the BTV’s experiment there are two decision situations—the subjects evaluate 
their risk preferences on a risk scale (Q) (Question 3 of the questionnaire); and the 
subjects play a one-shot 2 2 coordination game (G). For simplicity, the subjects are 
characterized as either risk-averse or risk-loving in the questionnaire depending on 
whether they scored a value on the risk scale above or below 50, respectively (only a 
negligible number of the subjects scored exactly 50 on the risk scale). Further, I 
characterize the subjects as either risk-averse or risk-loving in the coordination game 
depending on whether they played the risk-dominant or Pareto-dominant strategy, 
respectively. So in effect, there are two, non-repeated and non-strategic, decision 
situations. 
 Consider the case when Q and G are two operators that commute. Each of them is 
characterized by two eigenvalues—a subject is risk-averse (in the questionnaire 
[ Qra ]; in the 2x2 game [ Gra ]) or risk-loving (in the questionnaire [ Qrl ]; in the 2x2 
game [ Grl ]). To each of these eigenvalues, there is a corresponding eigenvector 
( Qra , Gra , Qrl , Grl , respectively). Under the assumption that Q and G 
commute, the initial state of a subject is: 
(2) 
1 2 3 4Q G Q G Q G Q Gra ra ra rl rl ra rl rl         
with 
24
1
1i
i




 under the normalization condition. Now, if one measures first G 
(that is, subjects play the coordination game right away), the probability of 
observing Gra is: 
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(3) 
2 2
1 3Pr( ) .Gra     
This probability could be interpreted either as the fraction of subjects who choose 
the riskless strategy in the game (corresponding to risk-averse behavior) or the 
probability with which this strategy is chosen by a single player. 
 Alternatively, one can measure first Q. Then, the probability with which Qra is 
observed is: 
(4) 
2 2
1 2Pr( ) .Qra     
The resulting post-measurement state (taking into consideration also the 
normalization condition) of the subject is: 
(5) 
1 2
2 2
1 2
.
Q
Q G Q G
ra
ra ra ra rl 

 



 
If one now measures G, Gra will occur with the following probability: 
(6) 
2
1
2 2
1 2
Pr( / ) .G Qra ra

 


 
The joint probability of  Gra  and Qra is found by applying the conditional 
probability formula: 
(7) 
2
1Pr( , ) Pr( )Pr( / ) .G Q Q G Qra ra ra ra ra    
The joint probability of Gra and Qrl  is calculated analogously: 
(8) 
2
3Pr( , ) Pr( )Pr( / ) .G Q Q G Qra rl rl ra rl    
Finally, the marginal probability of observing Gra , when one measures first Q and 
then G, is given below: 
(9) 
2 2
1 3Pr ( ) Pr( , ) Pr( , ) .QG G G Q G Qra ra ra ra rl       
9 
 It is obvious from Equation (9) and Equation (3) that the risk-dominant strategy 
in the coordination game is played with the same probability regardless of whether 
subjects have previously completed the risk questionnaire. The same result holds 
also for the Pareto- dominant strategy. The conclusion is that, when two decision 
situations commute, the predictions of the standard economic theory and those of the 
present model of uncertain preferences coincide. 
 The case when the two operators Q and G do not commute is considered next. 
Also in this case, each of the operators is characterized by two eigenvalues and 
eigenvectors corresponding to these eigenvalues. The difference to the previous case 
is that the eigenvectors of each of the operators constitute two different bases in the 
relevant Hilbert space and the state of a subject could be written in terms of only one 
of these bases. For example, it can be written as follows: 
(10) 
1 2Q Qra rl    . 
Each vector from one of the bases can be expressed as a linear combination of the 
vectors of the other basis. Consider: 
(11) 
1 2
3 4
Q G G
Q G G
ra ra rl
rl ra rl
	 	
	 	
 
 
. 
Substituting for Qra  and Qrl in (10) and rearranging the terms, results in the 
following state vector: 
(12) 

  
 1 1 2 3 1 2 2 4G Gra rl  	  	  	  	    . 
Measuring first G, Gra is found with probability: 
(13) 
2
1 1 2 3Pr( )Gra  	  	  . 
Alternatively, one can measure first Q and receive Qra with probability: 
(14) 
2
1Pr( )Qra  . 
After the measurement of Q, the state vector collapses to: 
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(15) 

 1 1 2
2
1
Q
G G
ra
ra rl 	 	



 . 
Now, if G is measured, Gra occurs with the following probability: 
(16) 
2 2
1 1
2
1
Pr( / )G Qra ra
 	


. 
By applying the conditional probability formula, the joint probability of Gra and 
Qra is found to be equal to: 
(17) 
2 2
1 1Pr( , ) Pr( )Pr( / )G Q Q G Qra ra ra ra ra  	  . 
The joint probability of Gra and Qrl is calculated analogously: 
(18) 
2 2
2 3Pr( , ) Pr( )Pr( / )G Q Q G Qra rl rl ra rl  	  . 
The final step is to calculate the marginal probability of Gra , when one measures 
first Q and then G: 
(19) 
2 2 2 2
2 3 1 1Pr ( )QG Gra  	  	  . 
 It is obvious that, in the general case, the expression in (19) is different from the 
expression in (13). In addition, the result for Pr ( )QG Gra and an analogously 
calculated result for Pr ( )QG Grl will not sum up to 1. This observation implies that 
when two operators do not commute, the probability space changes after each 
measurement and a joint probability between elements from the two probability 
spaces is not a defined event. Consequently, behavioral choices will not be 
independent of the order in which decision situations are encountered. 
 In relation to the BTV’s result, the model of uncertain preferences implies that 
the risk questionnaire and the coordination game are two decision situations which 
do not commute. The subjects from Condition G and Condition Q_G play the same 
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coordination game. However, at the time of playing the game, they are in a different 
sate, which explains the differences in the distributions of their strategy choices. 
 
 
6. Conclusion 
  
Based on a simple model of uncertain preferences, this paper seeks to provide an 
explanation of the experimental results reported in BTV. In quantum mechanics 
framework, the type of player is not deterministic, as stipulated by the standard 
economic theory. Rather, it is assumed that the subjects possess uncertain 
preferences. With uncertain preferences, the order in which two (or more) decision 
situations are encountered will matter (not matter) if the decision situations “do not 
commute” (“commute”). The BTV’s experimental results could then be interpreted 
as evidence to show that the risk questionnaire and the coordination game are two 
decision situations which do not commute, and that the difference between the 
strategic behavior of subjects who completed the questionnaire before playing the 
game and that of the subjects who played the game right away should come as no 
surprise. 
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